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Abstract 
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Many countries employ “alternative access schemes” (e.g. compassionate use, early access 
programs, off-label use) that seek to provide patients with access to drugs not included on a 
positive drug list. These schemes offer flexibility to policy-makers but often lack transparency 
and clear rules. This ambiguity allows for dynamic responses to weaknesses in the main drug 
approval and reimbursement systems, but also opportunistic use by the health professionals, 
industry or patients. Yet, most descriptions of these schemes focus on the de jure rather than the 
de facto situation, presenting a potentially misleading picture. We describe one such scheme in 
practice: the Slovak “extraordinary reimbursement” regime (ERR), using semi-structured 
interviews with 18 experts and a new dataset of ERR drugs. The ERR expanded rapidly, 
doubling between 2012 and 2016. It combined features of four reimbursement schemes: (1) a 
backdoor market access for expensive drugs; (2) a compassionate use scheme for investigational 
drugs combined with a “legacy drugs” scheme for older unlicensed drugs; (3) a disease-specific 
scheme for cancer and orphan drugs; and (4) a scheme for off-label and “off-indication” drugs. 
These four features reflect broader challenges facing the Slovak reimbursement system. We 
conclude that detailed study of the type, size and evolution over time of alternative access 
schemes can serve as indicators of health policy objectives neglected by standard reimbursement 
systems.  
 
Keywords: Pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement; Early access; Off-label; Rare diseases; 
Oncology; Slovakia  
 
Introduction  
 
Health policy-makers in most European countries have put in place sophisticated health 
technology assessment (HTA) and pricing and reimbursement (P&R) procedures for 
pharmaceuticals to achieve effective use of limited public resources. In principle, only high-
quality drugs that do not pose an undue burden for public budgets are placed on positive drug 
lists (PDLs). In practice, however, many countries have recourse to “alternative access schemes” 
that seek to provide patients with access to drugs that are not available to them via the PDL [1]. 
The English Cancer Drugs Fund is perhaps the best known example of such a program, 
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circumventing the existing HTA-based system [2], but it is far from the only one. Other 
examples common in Europe include individual patient funding requests [e.g. 3], early access 
programs [4], compassionate use [5], named-patient basis early access [4,6,7], and off-label use 
[8,9].  
The rules for reimbursing drugs via alternative schemes are typically more lenient than the 
standard HTA and P&R processes (as with the Cancer Drugs Fund). Alternative schemes are 
also often less transparent, using ad hoc criteria and post-market data collection – the fact that 
France is lauded as an exception in formalizing its compassionate and off-label rules is telling 
[10]. As such, alternative access schemes present “grey zones” of reimbursement governance, 
with unclear consequences for patient access, equity and public budgets [1]. As drug prices 
continue to grow, as has been the case in the past with orphan drugs [11] or novel drugs for 
hepatitis C [12,13] and high cholesterol [14], we can expect alternative access schemes to 
become ever more important. However, the combination of ambiguity with scope for 
interpretation of terminology and powerful incentives, for patients, health professionals, and 
manufacturers, creates considerable scope for dynamic responses to weaknesses in the main 
approval and reimbursement systems, including potentially opportunistic ones, so that the 
schemes are extended to medicines and indications for which they were likely never intended. 
Yet, most descriptions of these schemes focus on the de jure rather than the de facto situation, 
presenting a potentially misleading picture. 
In this paper, we unpack one case of alternative access in practice: the Slovak “extraordinary 
reimbursement regime” (ERR). The ERR permits statutory health insurance funds to grant 
reimbursement to individual patients for drugs that are not on the country’s PDL, similar to 
individual funding requests in the UK [3]. Following a change of ministers in 2016, the ERR had 
become a focus of domestic policy and media attention. An audit showed that ERR spending for 
the country’s three statutory health insurers had tripled from less than €10 million to almost €30 
million between 2011 and 2015 [15]. The press and civil society organizations highlighted 
opacity in the ERR’s operations and raised concerns about equity, pointing to patients with rare 
diseases whose applications were treated differently by individual statutory health insurance 
funds [16,17]. The ERR, in other words, was a black box, in stark contrast to the country’s 
otherwise highly transparent and cost-conscious P&R policy [18].  
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We examine how the Slovak ERR worked in practice during the years of its steep growth in 
2012-2016. In particular, we analyse what drugs were funded by the ERR and why, as well as 
how the scheme was governed. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first detailed study of 
the de facto operation of an alternative access scheme in a European country.  
 
 
Drug reimbursement in Slovakia 
 
Slovakia has a social health insurance system with three nation-wide statutory health insurance 
funds: the state-owned General Health Insurance Fund (Všeobecná zdravotná poisťovňa, VšZP) 
covers about 63 percent of the population, while the two privately owned funds, Trust (Dôvera) 
and Union, cover the remainder of the population – about 27 percent and 9 percent, respectively. 
Decisions on pricing and reimbursement rates, including co-payment, are taken nationally by the 
Minister of Health upon advice of the Categorization Committee, composed of representatives of 
the Ministry of Health, payers, and clinicians nominated by the Minister. The Committee is in 
turn advised by a working group of clinical experts and the “Expert Working Group for 
Pharmacoeconomics, Clinical Outcomes and Assessment of Health Technologies”, both 
appointed by the Minister from nominations by professional societies. Payers have two 
representatives in the working group on pharmacoeconomics (one for VšZP and one for the 
privately owned funds, with another three members representing the Ministry of Health), which 
is a key player in the reimbursement process [19], as it must certify the drug’s compliance with 
Law 363/2011, which sets out strict cost-effectiveness requirements. During the period under 
study (2012-2016), a drug could only be included on the PDL if its incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio per quality-adjusted life year was lower than 24 times the average monthly 
wage (€20,592 in 2016), and could be conditionally reimbursed if under 35 times the average 
monthly wage (€30,030). The thresholds were not applicable to drugs for diseases with 
prevalence below 1:100,000 [20]. Inclusion of drugs on the PDL that exceeded the upper 
threshold was not possible. 
Law 363/2011 gave payers the possibility to fully or partially reimburse drugs that were not 
registered or reimbursed in Slovakia or drugs that are on the PDL but whose use goes beyond 
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their indication or prescription restrictions. This procedure became known in Slovakia as 
applying for extraordinary (or exceptional) reimbursement (“na výnimku”, literally “as a matter 
of exception”), termed ERR in this paper. The law specified that the case needed to be justified, 
“notably” by the drug being the only option to improve the patient’s health status, and the 
application needed to be submitted by the patient’s health care provider. No other criteria for 
making decisions on ERR applications were spelled out.  
A 2017 reimbursement reform, implemented as of 2018 [21], modified some of these rules. We 
briefly describe the reform in the discussion.   
 
 
Data and methods 
 
Based on a request addressed to the Slovak Ministry of Health, we obtained a dataset of drugs 
reimbursed via the ERR by VšZP between 2012 and 2016. The dataset contained brand names of 
drugs reimbursed via the regime, the corresponding anatomical therapeutic chemical (ATC) 
groups, and the number of patients, packages, and cost per year per drug. All price data were 
adjusted for inflation using the Slovakian annual average inflation rates between 2012 and 2016 
and expressed in 2012 Euros [22].  
We complemented this data with information from the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and 
the Slovak State Institute for Drug Control websites [23,24]. We verified each ERR drug’s status 
on the Slovak PDL by comparing the annual list of ERR drugs with PDLs for January each year, 
available on the Ministry of Health website [25], using the Microsoft Excel fuzzy lookup add-in.  
Similar data could not be obtained from the remaining two privately owned statutory insurers, 
Dôvera and Union, so the rest of this paper focuses exclusively on VšZP ERR. While this 
necessarily limits the breadth of our findings, VšZP is the most important player in Slovak ERRs 
thanks to its dominance in terms of both the percentage of population it insures and share of ERR 
applications. According to one report, almost 90 percent of all successful ERR requests in 
Slovakia in 2012-2015 were granted by VšZP, 10 percent by Dôvera and around 1 percent by 
Union, despite Dôvera’s and Union’s proportionally larger market share [16]. VšZP also tended 
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to reject slightly fewer applications, about 10 to 11 percent in 2011-2015, compared with 
Dôvera’s and Union’s use of their discretionary prerogative to reject 14 percent on average. The 
net effect is that VšZP consistently accounted for about 80-82 percent of all extraordinary 
reimbursement requests paid in Slovakia, while Dôvera’s share fluctuated around 16-20 percent 
and Union’s was marginal at 0.09 to 2 percent (see supplementary table 1).  
The VšZP dataset has several limitations. First, it does not specify the reason for granting 
individual exceptions, such as a particular indication. Second, especially for drugs without an 
EMA or ŠÚKL marketing authorization date, we were not able to determine reliably their 
intellectual property status. Third, for drugs without EMA registration, we were unable to 
identify indications systematically. Together, these limitations make it difficult to analyse, for 
example,  the ERR’s priority disease and spending areas (for instance, new cancer drugs) using 
quantitative data. However, by combining the database findings with qualitative interview data in 
a mixed-methods approach we were able to draw additional conclusions.  
[Researcher] conducted two rounds of semi-structured expert and elite interviews [26,27] with 
18 actors knowledgeable about Slovak HTA and reimbursement decision-making. Our research 
was approved by the Ethics Committee at the Department of Sociology, [University name]. The 
first round of interviews was conducted in Bratislava in December 2016 and January 2017, while 
the second round took place over the telephone (one over email) in February 2018. The first 
round focused on general aspects of the Slovak P&R and HTA processes. The second round was 
informed by the VšZP dataset and focused specifically on the ERR. To solicit informed 
responses, we shared with interviewees selected findings from the dataset. We obtained informed 
consent from all interviewees. We protect the interviewees’ anonymity by assigning numbers 
(e.g. “I-20”) and broad interviewee categories (see supplementary table 2). All interviewee 
quotes were translated from Slovak.  
We identified interviewees via purposive sampling based on publicly available documents and 
subsequent snowballing.  Repeated interviewees were selected for their detailed knowledge of 
the ERR. In total, 48 potential interviewees were identified; 28 were prioritized and contacted; 5 
refused (3 of whom suggested alternative interlocutors from their organization) and 5 did not 
respond. 6 were approached for a repeated interview (1 did not respond and 1 could not be 
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reached). Refusals and non-responses were spread evenly across interviewees’ institutional 
affiliations.  
Interview data were analysed by [Researcher] using qualitative content analysis based on 
inductive codes [28]. Quantitative data was analysed by [Researchers]. All data were discussed 
with [Researchers]. [Researchers] contributed to the interpretation. Elite interviews face potential 
risks of omission, misrepresentation or deception by the interviewees; this risk was partially 
mitigated by our use of mixed methods, so that information was systematically triangulated with 
data from other interviews and, where available, published documents [29].  
 
 
Results 
 
The VšZP ERR expanded rapidly during the 2012-2016 study period. Spending patterns 
correspond to four distinct reimbursement schemes: a backdoor market access for expensive 
drugs; a compassionate use scheme for investigational drugs combined with a “legacy drugs” 
scheme for older unlicensed drugs; a disease-specific scheme for cancer and orphan drugs; and a 
scheme for off-label and “off-indication” drugs.  
 
Evolution in time: growth all around  
 
The ERR grew both in terms of patients and expenditure (Table 1). Between 2012 and 2016, the 
number of patients receiving ERR drugs, as well as spending on the regime, increased 
noticeably. The number of ERR drugs grew steadily and average yearly spending per patient 
increased by 18 percent, with a peak in 2013. The average total yearly spending per drug grew 
by 37 percent, while the average number of patients per drug remained more or less constant 
over the years at around 10 patients.  
Despite these increases, however, ERR spending remained a minor, if increasing, part of VšZP’s 
overall pharmaceutical spending: 1.8 percent in 2012 and 4.4 percent in 2016. As one payer 
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elucidated, “[the ERR] is an emergency solution. It doesn’t have a huge budget impact, the 
problem is the absence of criteria to [approve or reject an application]” (I-14 payer). 
Interviewees described the regime’s growth, rather than total cost, as the main cause for alarm: 
“It’s an increasingly important problem” (I-3, consultant); “there is a consensus that the [ERR] is 
not working as it should” (I-4, civil society).  
[table 1 around here] 
 
A parallel reimbursement system, or a “legacy drugs fund”? 
 
Most interviewees were concerned that the ERR was being used as “backdoor market access” for 
drugs which did not fulfil Slovakia’s 2011 strict cost-effectiveness criteria: “It has become a 
parallel reimbursement system” (I-22, civil society). Interviewees concurred that most new 
medicines were reimbursed only through the ERR, which they treat as a standard alternative: 
“Expensive medicines don’t even apply for regular reimbursement. They’re all pushed into the 
system through [the ERR]” (I-5, consultant). Conditional reimbursement was described as 
unattractive to manufacturers because of its low threshold as well as its long-term uncertainty. 
Perhaps surprisingly, interviewees insisted that the ERR also included a number of old, cheap 
branded medicines or even generics that had been withdrawn for safety concerns or discontinued 
for business reasons [see 30]. They may not be obsolete from a clinical point of view, but rather 
not viable from a business perspective because of their low prices on the Slovak market, and thus 
unattractive to marketing authorization holders. These drugs, which we here call “legacy drugs”, 
then need to be procured from abroad for individual patients. Legacy drugs do not have a valid 
marketing authorization with the Slovak ŠÚKL or the EMA. This would be similar to a 
compassionate use function, but for drugs not currently applying marketing authorization. The 
VšZP data do not allow us to conclusively confirm or disprove this assertion, but several 
conclusions can be reached by studying the relative importance of drugs grouped by their age for 
the cost of the ERR (see Figure 1). In short, old and unregistered drugs constitute the majority of 
all ERR drugs, but their financial impact is relatively limited; new drugs are more limited in 
numbers but are responsible for most ERR spending. 
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Old drugs registered by the EMA before 2002 (10 years prior to the beginning of our dataset and 
the entry into force of Law 363/2011) made up about 9 percent of ERR drugs, and were 
responsible for about 9 percent of total spending throughout the five years. Drugs registered by 
ŠÚKL before 2002 made up about 15 percent of all ERR drugs but only about 8 percent of total 
spending. Drugs registered by both regulators made up 5 percent of ERR drugs and 7 percent of 
total cost.  
Most numerous were drugs not registered by the EMA, ŠÚKL or either of the regulators, which 
made up 50 percent, 29 percent and 26 percent of all ERR drugs, respectively. These drugs could 
be drugs in Phase III clinical trials, which would suggest the ERR is being used for named-
patient basis early access or compassionate use scheme for investigational drugs. However, it is 
more likely that they are in fact legacy drugs which had been introduced on the market before the 
EMA centralized procedure (for those with no EMA registration) and/or had their registration 
withdrawn in Slovakia (for those with no ŠÚKL registration). (Legacy drugs may be authorized 
in other EU member states and thus available via the mutual recognition procedure [31]). This is 
the scenario suggested by the spending pattern: drugs registered by ŠÚKL but not EMA were 
responsible for about 15 percent of total spending in 2012, a figure that remained stable at 14 
percent in 2016 (Supplementary figure S1). Given this relatively low expenditure, we can expect 
most of these drugs to be older, pre-dating the centralized European authorization procedure, or 
falling out of its scope, which covers drugs for high priority diseases and/or important 
innovations.  
In terms of spending, though, by far the most important category were “newer” drugs registered 
between 2002 and 2011 by the EMA (responsible for 54 percent of total spending, and 25 
percent of all ERR drugs), followed by those registered during 2002-2011 by ŠÚKL (49 percent 
of spending for 30 percent of drugs), and the “newest” drugs registered after 2011 by ŠÚKL (41 
percent of spending for 26 percent of drugs) (Figure 1). This is also visible in the temporal 
pattern with a steady annual increase both in the number of drugs registered after 2002 and 2011 
(Supplementary figure 2) and in spending (Supplementary figure 3) throughout the years. Drugs 
registered with ŠÚKL after 2011 made up 24 percent of all ERR spending in 2012 and gradually 
increased to 57 percent by 2016. Spending on these drugs in 2016 was 4.8 times higher than in 
2012 after adjusting for inflation. Drugs registered with the EMA after 2011 made up 2.6 percent 
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of all ERR spending in 2012 and gradually increased to 44 percent by 2016 (we can reasonably 
expect the Slovak registration process to lag somewhat behind the EMA and thus to also include 
drugs registered by the EMA several years prior to 2011). Spending on these drugs in 2016 was 
almost 34 times higher than in 2012. In terms of the relative contribution of these different drug 
categories to the annual growth in ERR spending, drugs registered between 2002 and 2011 were 
responsible for most of the growth (range of the contribution to growth: 72-77 percent). Drugs 
registered by either of the regulators after 2011 and unregistered drugs contributed less to the 
ERR’s growth, while old drugs, registered before 2002, became less important financially as 
ERR spending grew (see Supplementary table 3). While this does not in itself confirm the ERR 
as “parallel reimbursement” from the point of view of the manufacturers, it strongly suggests that 
the regime is used as an access route from a patient and provider perspective.  
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
Priority disease areas: cancer and rare conditions 
 
The effects of the rigid reimbursement threshold were seen by nearly all interviewees as a driver 
of the increase in ERR expenditure, particularly because of new oncology drugs. Two reports 
document manufacturers’ reticence to apply for inclusion of cancer drugs on the PDL [32] [33], 
which was a common cause of concern. As one interviewee commented, “The whole of 
oncology has been dead since 2011” (I-7, patient). 
The ERR was thus seen as the only route through which Slovak patients could gain access, 
notably, to new cancer treatments. A payer described patient access enabled by the ERR as 
satisfactory: “Drugs are available because they get to patients via the ERR. Patients get them in 
70-80 percent of cases, and these are drugs which have problems getting listed even in rich 
countries” (I-6). Similarly, an industry representative estimated that “40-50 new drugs haven’t 
been put on the PDL after 2011. Not all of them are available [through the ERR], but most are” 
(I-26).  
Table 2 presents the 20 most expensive drugs in VšZP’s ERR over the entire 2012-16 period. 
Altogether, they made up 58.5 percent of the total expenditure of the ERR. As for disease areas, 
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11 are cancer drugs; three target diseases of the nervous system, and a further three are enzyme 
replacement therapy for rare diseases. The 20 most expensive drugs were used to treat a total of 
maximum 2,574 patients over the years (a quarter of the 10,634 patients overall). Importantly, 
eight of these drugs are subject to additional monitoring as per their EMA registration, including 
two being subject to conditional approval and exceptional circumstances at approval, 
respectively, indicating the regulator’s concerns about safety and efficacy.  
[table 2 around here]  
 
In practice, the absolute availability of new therapies in Slovakia was perhaps less problematic 
than the lack of explicit indication criteria and restrictions on patient populations. Patient 
populations were determined by each payer: “We try to set restrictions together with experts, but 
it is never for the full population need” (I-14, payer). An industry representative noted: “The 
problem is that twenty patients get the drug instead of a hundred. […] New drugs are available, 
but according to criteria mastered by no-one” (I-26). Interviewees pointed to disparities among 
patient groups: where expensive innovative therapies had been put on the PDL before 2011, 
serving later as comparators, patients had relatively high standards of care, for instance in 
rheumatology (I-7, patient). Cancer patients, on the other hand, had to rely on the ERR.  
The same was the case for some patients with rare diseases. Although drugs for rare diseases 
were not legally required to prove their cost-effectiveness, the definition of a rare disease for 
reimbursement purposes by Law 363/2011 was more restrictive than requirements for European 
Union orphan designation (maximum prevalence 1 in 100,000 in Slovakia, compared to 5 in 
10,000 for the EMA). This created a gap in access to orphan drugs (I-5, I-1), where, according to 
a consultancy report, most drugs with EMA orphan designations did not apply for the PDL [34]. 
Table 3 shows that the number of orphan drugs as well as patients in the ERR continually grew, 
including the average number of patients per drug (from 7 to 10 over the years). Part of the 
growth may be due to an increased number of oncology drugs with EMA orphan designation in 
the ERR. Seven of the 20 most expensive drugs had orphan designation, out of which five are 
cancer drugs. Orphan drugs were responsible for about 29 percent of ERR spending in 2012; this 
share increased to 40 percent by 2016. We also observed a 2.8 fold increase in annual spending 
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on orphan drugs. Orphan drugs were given for about 11 percent of the total patients in ERR in 
2012, and it remained relatively stable over time, reaching 14 percent by 2016. 
[table 3 around here] 
 
Overlap with positive drug list: off-label or off-indication 
 
A significant proportion of drugs were reimbursed via the ERR while simultaneously being on 
the PDL. While 51 percent of ERR drugs were not reimbursed through the ordinary PDL 
procedure in any given year, 31 percent of them were included on both lists for all five years of 
the study period, with the remainder being included on both lists for at least one year. The 
proportion of drugs on both lists increased steadily from 19.9 percent in 2012 to 27.7 percent in 
2016 (supplementary table 4). 
These drugs may, in principle, fall into three categories. First, they can be used “off-label”, for 
treating an indication for which they had not been licensed by ŠÚKL or the EMA [5], a practice 
common globally [9,10]. Second, they can be “off-indication” according to the Slovak PDL. In 
this case, the relevant indication may well be on-label per EMA (and/or ŠÚKL) registration, but 
not included on the PDL, most often presumably because of exceeding the cost-effectiveness 
threshold for the given indication (but satisfying it for others). Third, these drugs can be “off-
prescription restrictions”, i.e. requested by physicians who are not authorized to prescribe them.  
The VšZP data does not allow us to differentiate between these cases. Interviewees, however, 
saw the off-label and off-indication uses as most common, and the “off-prescription restrictions” 
situation as marginal. They also described off-label and off-indication uses as “completely 
legitimate” (I-7, patient): “These [are probably] experiments with fourth, sixth-line treatment… I 
understand that the clinician wants to try anything, this is fully lege artis” (I-3, consultant).  
 
Discussion  
 
 13 
 
This paper set out to unpack the Slovak extraordinary reimbursement regime in 2012-2016 as a 
case of alternative access schemes in a single jurisdiction. Our study has three major limitations. 
First, the quantitative part of our data relies on a single statutory payer, the VšZP. Second, our 
data did not include details of the indications of the funded ERR drugs, limiting our ability to 
interpret some findings. Third, our analysis is based on a single case study that is, to a certain 
extent, idiosyncratic. For example, while the Slovak “legacy drug scheme” may look familiar to 
small countries with low drug prices, its generalizability to jurisdictions seen as core 
pharmaceutical markets is likely limited.   
We found that, rather than providing a coherent funding scheme for a defined group of patients 
or drugs, the ERR encompassed all cases left behind by ordinary reimbursement rules, resulting 
in an amalgam of various alternative access schemes. First, the ERR was used as a “backdoor 
market access” chiefly for new expensive drugs, circumventing Slovakia’s strict P&R rules. 
Second, it served as a compassionate use scheme for unlicensed investigational drugs, as well as 
a “legacy drugs fund” for old drugs no longer authorized on the Slovak market. Third, and in 
financial terms most importantly, it acted as a disease-specific fund for cancer and orphan drugs, 
analogous to the English Cancer Drugs Fund [35]. Finally, the ERR overlapped with the positive 
drug list, indicative of off-label and “off-indication” use.  
The type, size and evolution over time of alternative access schemes can serve as indicators of 
the ability of a health system to respond dynamically, even if to some extent informally, to 
perceived problems with standard reimbursement systems, that increasingly employ 
sophisticated “template driven” [36] methods based on evidence-based medicine and HTA. The 
Slovak ERR data did not allow us to establish the relative size of each of its components in terms 
of number of drugs or patients, or spending. Nonetheless, our observations point to several issues 
with Slovakia’s P&R system. First, the dominance of cancer drugs in the Slovak ERR points to 
an underserved patient population. Second, the existence of the off-label/off-indication category 
indicates an evolving gap between clinical practice and regulatory or reimbursement restrictions, 
and by extension a possible disconnect between tolerance and interpretation of risk by experts as 
opposed to the patients or their physicians. Third, the ERR’s expansion could suggest that the 
PDL was failing to meet the needs or demands of certain populations. However, it is also 
necessary to determine whether this demand reflects genuine unmet medical need or supplier-
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induced demand for certain products. Without transparent data on unmet patient need for 
different conditions and individual ERR requests in Slovakia, this is difficult to assess.  
Reasons for the evolution of alternative access schemes are context-dependent. In Slovakia, ERR 
growth corresponded with the 2011 P&R reform. In addition to the  strict cost-effectiveness 
threshold, the reform’s exceptional degree of transparency [18] prevented payers from 
concluding confidential price agreements with manufacturers. In response, a 2017 reform 
(chiefly in Law 336/2017) increased the lower and upper cost-effectiveness thresholds used in 
pharmacoeconomic analyses from 24-35 times the average monthly wage to 35-41 times 
(arriving at around €37,000 in 2018, above the National Institute of Health and Care Excellence 
threshold in England) and allowed for the consideration of multiple criteria in determining cost-
effectiveness. Manufacturers of medicines with fewer than 1:50,000 eligible patients were 
exempted from submitting cost-effectiveness analysis prior to reimbursement decisions.  In 
parallel, it introduced the possibility of confidential managed-entry agreements, and mandatory 
paybacks for drugs under volume-capped conditional reimbursement (for any drug, including 
“orphan” drugs, with budget impact above €1.5 million per year). It also regulated the ERR: off-
indication and unregistered drugs need approval from the Ministry of Health and may be 
reimbursed up to 100 percent. All other drugs may be reimbursed to a decreasing extent over 
time (90 percent of their price in the first year on the Slovak market, 80 percent in their second 
and 75 percent in their third year) and are subject to a 5 percent co-payment by the provider – the 
latter condition was scraped later in 2018 following widespread concerns about patient access 
[37]. Drugs rejected from the ordinary reimbursement scheme on cost-effectiveness grounds 
became exempt from the payment limits and provider co-payment, in order to incentivize 
manufacturers to apply via the ordinary reimbursement procedure. Experts have since questioned 
the economic rationale for the reform’s increase of the cost-effectiveness threshold [38]. The 
Ministries of Finance and Health, in turn, criticized the reform for incentivizing manufacturers to 
artificially restrict indications in order to bypass cost-effectiveness requirements by claiming to 
have a “rare disease” target population of less than 1:50,000 [39]. The reform was further 
amended as of January 2019.   
Whether these changes will be successful in containing the ERR’s growth remains to be seen. 
Broader structural factors are also likely at play here: namely, the surge of premium-priced drugs 
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over the past decade; the popularity of international reference pricing in other jurisdictions 
(affecting manufacturers’ willingness to enter a low-priced market); and the low priority that 
small markets receive from the original and generic industries. That these factors played a role in 
Slovakia is suggested by the similar or even stronger growth of equivalent programs in other 
countries, e.g. in Hungary and the Czech Republic [40], or other alternative schemes, e.g. in 
Scotland [41]. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper looked into the “black box” of the alternative access scheme in Slovakia. Our case 
study shows that studying alternative access schemes can act as an indicator of the “health” of 
P&R policies by identifying the kind, size and importance of patient populations left behind by 
PDLs. Their analysis can help policy-makers decide whether and how to structure their response.  
The existence of alternative schemes per se is not necessarily undesirable. They offer important 
flexibility to accommodate individual patients’ needs, as well as specificities of some drugs or 
patient groups. As the Slovak case illustrates, however, they can present normative problems. 
One such issue is their lack of transparency and clear rules for including patients’ views [42]. 
Although the ERR was used to improve equity between patient groups (with cancer and rare 
disease patients facing disadvantages on the PDL), the opacity of the regime and the lack of 
criteria for granting individual applications created concerns over equity within these groups, 
which are difficult to dissipate without data. More transparency and greater research on 
alternative access schemes would help to clarify their role in contemporary pharmaceutical 
policies and practices.  
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